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RESISTANCE IN THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

By E. A. Bayne

In the stone vastness of the Nuremberg Court House, there are perhaps a dozen former members of the German Foreign Office who have been assisting the prosecution staffs of the International Military Tribunal. There is a certain poetic justice in the fact that these officials are thus grimly ending more than 10 years of secret war against Hitler's foreign policy.

There were not very many German Foreign Service officers who joined this fight, and of those who did, only a few are left to tell the tale of bitter frustration that dogged their efforts. These anti-Nazi career diplomats represent a triumph of loyalty to a democratic Germany. A handful of them survived the Gestapo terror that purged all walks of German life after the abortive putsch in July, 1944. Those who remain are not to be regarded as German traitors turned state's evidence, but as consistently patriotic democrats whose moral victory provides some comfort amid the ruin of a great nation.

These diplomats had seen the threatened evil of Hitler in the Twenties, had warily watched the reactionary von Papen Government, hoped vainly for protection from political disaster in the second election of Hindenburg. Foreign Office leaders like Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, Ulrich von Hassel, A. von Twardowski, Theodor Kordt, Otto Kiep (former Consul General in New York), Hasso von Etzdorf, Paul Schmidt and others were recognized at the League of Nations and in many important capitals as men of integrity and courage. Most of these men were liberal in outlook and political affiliation and despite Nazi domination they zealously strove to uphold the reputation of Germany in the family of nations.

The rise of Nazism put the members of the German diplomatic service in a quandary. Some of them became active Party members. A few resigned or left the country. Quite a number, perhaps a hundred of the career service, elected to remain as a moderating influence and later, when the true stamp of Hitler became apparent, worked secretly as key

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men for the sabotage or overthrow of Nazism. Under the extraordinary circumstances the latter choice was honorable. The loyalty of a civil servant is to the nation, not to a specific administration. To many German diplomats Hitler simply did not, and could not, speak for Germany.

But as Hitler's control consolidated, as Hindenburg died, as the Army swore fealty to Hitler and the Gestapo established its ruthless rule, it became apparent that only an international crisis could defeat the Führer. Liberal Germans were faced with tragic alternatives: wait for a military defeat that would remove Hitler but ruin their country; or fashion a revolt dependent upon a diplomatic defeat of such magnitude that the people could not fail to see its significance. These Foreign Office liberals knew that a popular revolt was impossible in a totalitarian country and that a coup d'état depended upon a few top-drawer leaders. With a successful putsch, it was reasoned, the truth of Nazi corruption, inefficiency and evil leadership would be obvious, and the German people would unite to confirm a return to democratic government.

There were scores of resistance groups in Germany, some of which started before the war, whereas others grew up after the Wehrmacht had begun to suffer serious defeats on the Eastern Front. Most of these were regional, for the Gestapo made consolidation of these groups difficult, if not impossible. Karl Gördeler, as related in the recent HUMAN EVENTS Analysis on "The Epic of the German Underground", was one of the few resistance leaders who managed to reach other groups and develop a nation-wide program for expulsion of the Nazi Administration. In this work he relied heavily on the band of sympathetic diplomatic officers and the military group with which they eventually joined. The part of these German diplomats in the epic should also be made available to Americans.

II

Early in the Nazi régime, when Hitler appointed von Ribbentrop Commissioner for Disarmament Questions, he requested Secretary of State Bernhard W. von Bülow to provide assistance to the new Commissioner. Von Bülow named Erich Kordt, former Secretary of the German Delegation to the League of Nations, to be Ribbentrop's aide, and instructed him: "At no time conceal or correct the incompetence and errors of the new special commissioner.

Then he will have enough rope to hang himself."

But Ribbentrop unfortunately did not hang himself. And Hitler's estimate of the champagne salesman increased despite the latter's exhibition of extreme bad taste as Ambassador to Britain, his jealous fear of encroachments in the foreign field by Goebbels and Hess and his generally bad judgment.

During the spring of 1934, a clash between the Reichswehr and the Nazi private armies seemed unavoidable. At this time the anti-Nazi conspiracy began to take shape, its objectives clearly seen, its trusted members known only to a few. The first necessity was constant intelligence on official developments. But the destruction of Hitler emerged sharply as the vital target.

The Foreign Office was being pushed aside by the Nazis. Ribbentrop created a personal bureau with a staff of more than 300. Fortunately for the conspirators, he retained Erich Kordt as his deputy, providing the opposition with a vital link to Hitler's inner circle. For example, Hitler's decisions to re-establish compulsory military service and to re-occupy the Rhineland were relayed to the Foreign Office first by Kordt. Even von Neurath, who was then Foreign Minister, had to learn of these decisions without participating in them.

Secretary of State von Bülow was a close friend of General Ludwig Beck, then Chief of the German General Staff. They shared the same anti-Hitler convictions. In 1936, Erich Kordt divined from a short dinner conversation with Admiral Canaris, Chief of Intelligence at the War Ministry, that he too was working against Hitler. Other Foreign Office members made contact with anti-Nazi political leaders. The night that former Chancellor Heinrich Brüning secretly left Germany, he met with Theodor Kordt and they agreed that Brüning's former secretary, Dr. Günther Bergemann, would provide liaison.

Dr. Paul Schmidt, official German interpreter at the League of Nations with ministerial rank, had been assigned to the German disarmament mission as interpreter for Ribbentrop. Hitler had previously used him to interpret during the Berlin visit of Anthony Eden and Sir John Simon. Schmidt was destined to become a confidant of Hitler, who was boyishly impressed with the former's learning and experience on the European diplomatic

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stage. Kordt and Schmidt agreed to share all intelligence available to them about the policies of Nazism; and while Schmidt was dubious about the success of the conspiracy, he never hesitated to give full reports on Hitler's conferences and secret schemes.

III

The chief function of the Foreign Office conspirators was to provide inside information for the resistance leaders. When the network was established, it reached from Hitler's desk to the Foreign Office, to the Army High Command and intelligence organization, and to the many leading citizens (as noted in HUMAN EVENTS of February 27) whose responsibility it was to develop the coup d'état.

All communication was by word of mouth only and, especially over the telephone, in coded conversation. Tension was constant, for Himmler and Ribbentrop were both extremely suspicious, and frequently appointed secret operatives as assistants to suspected members of the Foreign Office. One of these agents, Reinhold Spitzzy, ultimately admitted his Gestapo mission and asked if he could help the conspiracy, although he had no more than his suspicions to prove there was one. After a time he was admitted, and gave valuable service in acting as a courier between London and Berlin, memorizing whole reports. Erich Kordt's desk in "Bureau Ribbentrop" became the transmission point.

Since Ribbentrop was inexperienced and ignorant, the opposition group in his office was able to influence some of his appointments, thus placing their friends in strategic positions. In this manner Baron von Weizsäcker was made Secretary of State after von Bülow; Theodor Kordt, Erich's brother, was sent to London as Chargé d'Affaires; Albrecht von Kessel and von der Heyden-Rynsch, working under the supervision of Kiep, were made liaison men with the War Ministry. One member of the group, Bruecklmeier, was arrested by the Gestapo and subjected to torture; but he divulged nothing.

Up to 1938, members of the conspiracy had managed to keep out of the Nazi Party, but then an edict by Hess made it imperative that they join or face expulsion from government service. The Secretary of State, however, arranged that while the names would be added to the Party rolls with the usual equivalent SS ranks, no member would be required to sign the Party oath.

IV

In May, 1938, Hitler held a secret conference and drew up his annexation plan for all Czechoslovakia; simultaneously ordering the construction of the West Wall. This seemed to provide the overt act of aggression which the Underground needed to move against the Führer. After conferences with von Weiszäcker and Beck it was decided to inform the British Government of Hitler's secret plan. Beck believed that a firm declaration by Britain would place him in a position where he could incite the Army to revolt.

During July, the conspirators made contact with Philip Conwell-Evans, an Englishman in close touch with Downing Street, and requested him to transmit Hitler's plans to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. In addition, Theodor Kordt, then at the London Embassy, visited Sir Horace Wilson, one of Chamberlain's advisers, and told him of Hitler's plans. Late at night Wilson took Kordt through the rear entrance of Number 10 Downing Street and had him repeat the information to Lord Halifax. The resistance leaders had thus advised the British of Hitler's intentions, so far as known, and of their own preparations for a putsch, but no stand was indicated by the British Government.

Beck had reason to believe that Hitler would order a general mobilization on September 16, and openly stated that, as Chief of the German General Staff, he was unprepared to accept the responsibility for a war with the Western Powers. Tactically, this was a mistake for Beck was promptly removed, with considerable loss of face, and was replaced by General Halder. The Nazis did not realize that the latter shared Beck's convictions and had agreed to participate in the planned revolt.

The role of Admiral Canaris had been to work out the detailed plans; the timing to depend upon the moment Hitler ordered a general mobilization. Colonel Oster, Canaris' deputy, reported that the Army's Commander-in-Chief, General von Brauchitsch, was finally ready to participate, and troop units were designated for a putsch. General von Witzleben, Garrison Commander of Berlin, was to place the city under martial law, take over public services, SS headquarters and communications. General von Brockdorf, commanding a Panzer division at Potsdam, was to rush these troops to the Reich Chancellory and occupy it; Hitler, himself, who was planning to make the announcement of a general mobilization in

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the Sports Palast, would there be taken into custody by the Berlin police under Count von der Schulenburg.

Then, tragically, came the hasty Godesberg conference and its aftermath at Munich. Hitler no longer needed to order mobilization. When Chamberlain left for England after the first conference, Hitler watched the car roll away, turned to Paul Schmidt and said: "I fooled the old bastard!"

V

The meaning of appeasement for the future of Europe was all too painfully evident to the conspirators. The group held together but, their plans gone awry, their faith in the Western Powers shaken, it was difficult to plan for another coup.

In the spring of 1939 Erich Kordt went to London and had various talks with Foreign Office officials. Kordt then also worked out arrangements for the entry into Britain of some Jewish leaders connected with the Underground. In April, the British Foreign Office was informed by Kordt of the impending alliance between Italy and Germany, and further that a change in Hitler's heretofore hostile attitude toward Russia was possible. In June, London was advised that secret negotiations were already in progress between Russia and Germany, and that an agreement dividing Eastern Europe into spheres of influence was being considered by Ribbentrop, as told by the latter in his testimony at the Nuremberg trial last week. The impression conveyed to Kordt was that Britain expected to come to an agreement with Russia long before Hitler's hopes could be realized.

In Germany, with the success of his bloodless conquests, Hitler's position grew stronger. Meanwhile, the leadership of the earlier frustrated conspiracy had been in part dispersed. Witzleben was sent to Frankfurt; General Brockdorf to North Germany; Halder, now that the die was cast for an adventure in Poland, was too closely associated with Hitler to be able to act. Another opportunity for a putsch might have been developed during Hitler's indecision before his final order for the advance into Poland, but time was too short.

Encouraged by his easy success in the Polish campaign, Hitler decided to launch a Blitzkrieg against France on November 14, 1939. Learning this, the conspirators agreed

that this development would facilitate another attempt to organize a putsch.

Ribbentrop left for field headquarters with Hitler, and the Foreign Office group seized the opportunity to place reliable officers in strategic posts with the Army, such as Count York von Wartenburg at the headquarters of General von Witzleben. Canaris developed the military aspects of the plan. Two divisions of the Army group under General Hoepfner were left in Berlin to surround the Chancellory and important Nazi centers. The draft of a general proclamation was prepared charging the Hitler régime with the murder of General von Fritsch and other crimes. This plan provided that Beck should take over the government and offer an immediate armistice to the Western Powers. But an Air Force intelligence officer reported rumors of the putsch to Goering. General von Brauchitsch had also told Hitler that the Army was not ready to attack. Hitler stormed at him but nevertheless postponed his plan for a Western offensive; declared that drastic action was needed in clearing the "decadent spirit" out of the High Command.

VI

When the attack came in the West, in May of 1940, the Nazi successes further enhanced the Führer's prestige and the Army leaders declared that they doubted any possibility of successful revolt until Hitler suffered a major military defeat. In April, 1942, with the Axis everywhere triumphant, General Beck told a group of his fellow-conspirators that to kill Hitler in the hour of his greatest success would only "further his evil influence on 'humanity'" by creating a new stab-in-the-back legend.

Another opportunity was not to come until the early summer of 1944, when German reverses in Russia were so great that not even the Gestapo could prevent the news of the disaster from spreading among the war-weary and bomb-shattered populace. Admiral Canaris and the Foreign Office group then risked everything in the attempted coup d'état already described by HUMAN EVENTS. Among the thousands of revengeful executions Canaris met one of the most hideous. A steel band was placed about his neck and he was hung until nearly dead. Then he was resuscitated and the process repeated. The sixth strangulation proved fatal.

Even though the conspirators failed to oust the Nazis, they consistently helped where

they could. In May, 1940, a member of the resistance group, von Nostitz, received notice from the Swiss Government that Brussels had been declared an open city. He conveyed the message to General Halder, without Ribbentrop's approval, and Brussels was thus saved the fate of Rotterdam. A German diplomatic representative in Copenhagen transmitted cables to Danish Consulates that were in reality instructions from the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. In 1942, the resistance group, through G rdeler, warned the Swedish Government that Hitler was considering invasion of that country. The Swedes immediately mobilized and thus avoided catastrophe. General Ott, German Ambassador to Tokyo, successfully pigeon-holed a proposal made jointly by Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, and Ribbentrop, that Allied PWs be shackled hand and foot.

The story of the Foreign Office conspiracy is no whitewash of an agency that was in many respects a very effective arm of Nazi aggression and power politics. The German diplomatic service during the Nazi r gime was shot through with Nazis and Nazi fellow-travellers, many of whom played diabolical and disgraceful roles. That is the more reason for giving due credit to those courageous career men who stood firm for their convictions and principles.

Space does not permit the full revelation of their heroic endeavor, heretofore so strangely concealed from American readers. Here it is enough to indicate the bitter story of frustration. These German career diplomats knew the amorality of Nazism, and the disaster that Nazism threatened for Germany and the world. They did what they could. When they failed, there was nothing left but to endure pulverization by the Allied bombers, and to hope that there would be enough of Germany left eventually to reassume its rightful place in a democratic world.

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E. A. Bayne was an intelligence officer of the Enemy Branch, Foreign Economic Administration, during the war, serving in Africa, Europe and China. His inside story of the Resistance Movement in the German Foreign Office is an important supplement to "The Epic of the German Underground", HUMAN EVENTS of February 27, 1946.

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Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to Human Events* Vol. III - No. 14

By Frank C. Hanighen

April 3, 1946

Whether or not the Iranian issue is permanently solved, the course of Soviet diplomacy presents a picture of additional Soviet aggression and non-compliance with democratic procedures in four important sectors elsewhere in the world:

(1) An uncensored dispatch to the London Observer, filed from Vienna after the correspondent had left Hungary, reported that strict censorship had been clamped on Budapest and that the Russian authorities had forced a new Communist Home Secretary (in charge of police) on the bourgeois Small Holders Party Government. The new Secretary had recently said that if the Small Holders Party would not give in to the Communists the latter "would not hesitate to use force". Next, another Communist replaced the Government Defense Minister and started to form Communist military units, or "storm troopers". These moves carry further recent Soviet strong-arm policy in Hungary -- purging of some members of the majority Small Holders Party, pressure on the Church, Soviet economic dominance, etc. In short, a Communist coup is taking place.

(2) Soviet attempts to force the German Social Democrats into a fusion with the Communists were highlighted on March 31 in Berlin. In the British, American and French zones, a plebiscite was held among Socialists on fusion, with an approximate 7 to 1 vote against the measure. The Russian authorities that day prevented any voting on fusion in their Berlin zone.

(3) The Soviet representative on the Far East Commission, M. Novikov, protested against the holding of elections in Japan, on April 10, as ordered by General MacArthur. The Commission turned down the protest.

(4) The same pattern of resistance to free elections, in which it was obvious that the Communists would make a poor showing, appears in the long-awaited elections in Greece. The Communist-controlled EAM opposed holding them, then staged a boycott on election day. Despite this opposition, a reasonably free election was reported and a large proportion of the electorate went to the polls, voting by a small majority for the strongest anti-Communist element, the Royalists.

The case of Greece has a wider significance than free balloting. Diplomatic circles here believe that the British Government is anxious to withdraw its forces from the country. Foreign Minister Bevin promised to do so after the elections, but he added "certain other conditions must be fulfilled". Military authorities believe that the "other conditions" involve removal of Russian armed forces from Albania, on Greece's northern border, as well as the large number of troops in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

The fact is that Albania is being strongly armed by Russia. Our observers have noted the influx of Russian troops as Yugoslav troops left the Russian puppet state of Dictator Hoxha. About the 1st of January new airfields were observed in course of construction. By the middle of February a dozen airports or airstrips had been counted. From this highly strategic area the Russian Air Force, in case of conflict with the West, could close the Adriatic; thereby cutting off one-quarter of total Italian port facilities. Naples also could be put under heavy and damaging bombardment. Finally, Greece would be in danger from Russian and Russian satellite troops and planes in Albania. Bevin quite probably was referring to this military situation.

Military observers also find in Albania a connection with Russian efforts to obtain a trusteeship in Tripoli. From air bases in Tripoli Soviet planes could ferry back and forth to Albania, cutting the British sea lane between Suez and Gibraltar. What seemed just a bargaining point for the Soviet Union may have had a very sound military consideration behind it.

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Secretary Byrnes, recently a target of foreign policy criticism, has earned much praise for his leadership at the UNO Security Council meetings in New York. He showed an intelligent grasp of all the intricacies of the Iranian problem and parliamentary dexterity in dealing with the other members of the Council. Those who knew him on Capitol Hill believe that he found himself in a congenial atmosphere at the Council table -- he was back at "committee work" again -- and handled himself better than at other international conferences. Some observers believe that Byrnes, in a sense, is fighting to hold his job. Rumors of continuing coolness between the Secretary of State and the President are frequent and it is still believed in some quarters that Truman did offer Byrnes' job to General Marshall and that the offer stands.

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The State Department's announcement of intention to send a new Ambassador to the Argentine comes on the heels of receipt of a stinging rebuke from the Republic of Colombia. This takes the form of a diplomatic reply to our hastily dished up "Blue Book" note -- Mr. Braden's odd attempt to influence the Argentine election campaign. The Colombian Government in ironic Castilian takes a sharp dig at the United States in one passage, recalling the fact that election campaigns in democratic countries are always marked by bitter accusations and charges which those who make them later wish forgotten. The Argentine campaign, the note reminds us, was fairly and correctly held; and Colonel Perón is now the legally elected President of a sovereign state. It serves no purpose -- the note went on -- to assail such a head of such a state, for his position is unassailable. These were some of the themes on which the Colombian Government played in one of the few responses which the State Department has received from its ill-fated diplomatic stunt. It is highly unlikely that Washington will divulge the contents of this note. But the Colombian Government -- one of the most democratic in the hemisphere -- has intimated that it may make the text public.

Colombia's reaction, as a matter of fact, seems to be typical of that of Latin America in general. Our diplomatic representatives in all the capitals south of the border are sending in similar reports on the state of opinion about Argentina. Other Latin Americans, like the Colombians, deplore the situation created by the Braden campaign against Perón, and demand the unification of the hemisphere states in a peace-time version of the widely popular Chapultepec Pact. Meanwhile the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Inter-American Defense Board are impatiently urging that steps be taken to galvanize hemispheric defense.

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The 77-page Report on International Control of Atomic Energy (probably written by David E. Lilienthal of TVA fame) which the United States Government released to the world on March 28 was put forward, it should be emphasized, "solely as a basis for discussion". For those fearful that the "atomic secrets" will be given away to a potentially hostile world, there is calming assurance that even if the plan were endorsed by Mr. Truman and the Army and Navy, many months would pass before it could be made ready for submission to UNO. For those impatient to rid the United States of exclusive possession of the bomb, there is hope in an intricately constructed scheme for control, bristling with safeguards as well as risks. To the hopeful, the scheme may appear as an unselfish sharing of a great new scientific force; to the cynical, it will look as if the whole world must be dotted with atomic bomb plants to prevent exclusive control by one nation or one group of nations. To all, will come surcease from the nightmare invoked by earlier and too zealous Paul Reveres of the atomic danger: the scientists in the report dismiss the possibility that chain neutron action can be set up and result in obliteration of the whole planet or life on it. Perhaps the net positive value of the report -- aside from its earnest and honest attempt to grapple with the fearsome problem -- will be in the debunking of previous misapprehensions about the bomb and means of controlling it. Scientists are that way -- as interested in the rejection of nostrums as in the development of cures.

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The election of Walter P. Reuther to the Presidency of the CIO United Auto Workers Union, numerically the largest union in America, was one act in a world-wide drama -- the conflict between Communists and Socialists -- which has reached great intensity in Western Europe. This act ended in a defeat for the Communists. For Reuther is a Socialist; he is detested as a "radical" by conservatives, but he is even more violently hated by the Communists, because he is stubbornly independent of Communist attempts to control him. Hence the Communists backed the less independent, more pliable as well as more conservative opponent, incumbent President R. J. Thomas, in an effort to beat Reuther.

Since the latter failed to get his candidates elected to the subordinate positions -- Vice Presidents, Secretary, etc. -- it remains to be seen how effectively he can guide the policies of the Union. But his announcement that he intended to fight elements subject to influences "outside the union", is a good indication that the conflict did not end with the balloting. Meanwhile, some observers of the labor scene believe that Reuther's election will encourage anti-Communist elements in other unions.

For American labor, particularly in the CIO, is now in the throes of a convulsion of no small magnitude and importance -- the revolt of American-minded labor union members against Communist infiltration and control. The struggle is now most marked in the CIO Transport Workers Union and in the National Maritime Union, both regarded as Communist-controlled.

A new alignment of leaders and forces within the labor movement is probably on the way, but has not yet crystallized. Reuther, head of a CIO union, is in close contact with Dubinsky, head of the large A. F. of L. Garment Workers Union, and an energetic proselytizer for the A. F. of L. Reuther has been accused of plans to desert the CIO and to bring his union into the A. F. of L. Dubinsky, in turn, enjoys close relations with John L. Lewis, now regarded as the bellwether of the A. F. of L. But Lewis is not on good terms with Reuther, whose socialistic ideas he dislikes, and is reported to have plans for breaking into the auto field. It will require much diplomacy on the part of Dubinsky to reconcile John L. Lewis' "free enterprise" attitude with Reuther's Marxist tendencies. But all three leaders have one enemy, the Communists, and some rallying of forces seems indicated.

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The new pattern for German industry announced in Berlin on March 28 is -- according to expert observers -- a modified Morgenthau Plan, but still retains the principal Morgenthau premise that de-militarization requires de-industrialization. The announced plan establishes three categories of German economy: (1) a preferred sector (agriculture and mining); (2) a restricted sector (metals, chemicals, tools, transportation, etc.); and (3) a forbidden sector. The latter category is made even wider than contemplated in the Potsdam Declaration by the addition of 14 industries. Many of the moderate suggestions of the unpublished Draper-Hoover report, drafted last fall, are now discarded. Professor Calvin Hoover and his associates had recommended that German industry be permitted to meet minimum domestic needs in locomotives, low-speed ball-bearings and machine tools, all of which are now ordered to be heavily restricted. Production of locomotives, for instance, is forbidden until 1949. This prohibition will affect not only Germany, but also its neighbors who badly need railroad equipment.

A careful analysis of the new plan suggests that the objective of preventing commercial competition was a factor not over-looked. Germany will not be allowed to produce any heavy machine tools; the remainder of this industry will be reduced to 11.4 per cent of 1938 production. It is said that these provisions were drafted in cooperation with market-hungry American machine tool interests. The same holds true of British and American shipping interests who managed to insert a clause in the Potsdam Declaration forbidding all production of sea-going vessels.

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Notes and Quotes

The New Yorker, in its recently acquired role of serious interpreter of world events, must leave some of its readers puzzled. Were they kidding Judge Rosenman in the following letter-press? In the March 23, 1946 issue, page 23, we read: "He [Judge Rosenman] worked up the agreement to run the war-crimes trials the way they're being run. . . ." After this flat statement, there followed in the issue of March 30, page 68, this passage: " . . . in that extremely important Göring-Jackson duel it was, unhappily, Prosecutor Jackson who lost. . . . There had been no 'battle of ideas', because Jackson seemed not to be able to think of any. There had been nothing more . . . than an important struggle between two opposing men's brains and personalities, and Göring showed more of both." On second thought, maybe the New Yorker was just kidding itself. It's time.

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In a lecture at Loyola University (Baltimore, Maryland) on March 31, Dr. Charles C. Tansill, Professor of History at Georgetown University, assigned heavy responsibility for the present ominous European situation to the late President Roosevelt. "Dr. Tansill placed the blame for the lack of political balance in Europe today on President Roosevelt", reported the Baltimore Sun (April 1). "It was Roosevelt's idea to crush Germany -- not Stalin's. Stalin said he wanted a strong Germany, but Roosevelt was obsessed with the idea of completely crushing the Germans. Now, as a result of this crushing of the Germans, there is no power in Europe to balance that of the Russians. And we have only Roosevelt to blame." Dr. Tansill added, "We are at war with Russia right now. It is now a battle of books and ideas, but it may extend to other fields of conflict. Stalin has his eyes fixed on the American front as the last great bulwark of democracy. If we meet and defeat the Red menace on the field of ideas, we may never have to blast it with atom bombs."

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The noted journalist John B. Powell stated in an unreported speech before the China Society of America (New York) on March 27, 1946: "When I was in Russia about ten years ago, I met a number of young Russians who were working on the Komsomolsk port projects on the Lower Amur. I was surprised to discover that they knew more about Alaska than I did and I frequently saw news dispatches and references to Alaska in the Russian newspapers. The young Russians, members of the Komsomols, or Young Communist League, all seemed to be under the impression that we had 'tricked' the Czar into selling Alaska for less than a penny an acre.

"I mention this because Alaska is certain to become more and more important in our relations with Russia, not only as a convenient 'bridge' of communication between North America and Russian Asia, but in other ways. I only need to mention that Russian military control of the Kuriles brings the armed forces of the Soviet Union within 700 miles of our outposts in the Aleutians."

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Stockholm radio (March 27) described recent developments in the atomic field, quoting various Swedish scientists on these questions, and then: "But these are involved matters and the average Swede apparently is not particularly interested in such things. He feels at the moment more interest for the study which the Emperor of Ethiopia is undertaking in Sweden than for the Nordic professors who are discussing the atomic problem. The fact is that Haile Selassie intends to take the Swedish educational system as a model with a view to reforming the backward customs in his own country."

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